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ABSTRACT: The Institute for Work, Skills and Training was assigned to evaluate a labor market 
program aimed at the integration of long-term unemployed individuals aged 50 or older. The 
integration should have been achieved not only by training and coaching of individuals, but also by 
building regional networks between labor market stakeholders within a region. To appraise the 
success of the action undertaken on the regional level in the sense of causal effects, an observational 
study was used. The experimental- and control-groups were built using propensity score matching. 
The matching was done using not individual-level data, but data on the regional level because of 
missing individual data and the aims of the program. The mean growth of the number of employees 
subject to social insurance contributions over time was chosen as the outcome of the program. The 
findings are that observational studies are suitable to estimate the causal effects of active labor market 
programs on the regional (macro) level if individual data are missing or if the aims of the program 
cannot be observed on the individual level. 
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n 2005 the Institute for Work, Skills and 
Training (IAQ) was assigned to evaluate a 
labor market program initiated by Germany’s 
former Federal Ministry for Labor and 
Economic Affairs (now Federal Ministry for 
Labor and Social Affairs) aimed at the 
integration of long-term unemployed1 
individuals aged fifty and older. Under the title 
“Perspektive 50plus—Beschäftigungspakte in 
den Regionen” (“Perspectives for 50plus—
Regional Pacts for Employment”), the program 
endeavored not only to overcome individual 
                                                
1 People who are without work for a minimum of twelve 
months are considered long-term unemployed. 
constraints regarding employability, but also to 
change the minds of personnel managers 
regarding age-specific human resource policies. 
These two main goals were pursued by offering 
training and coaching to individuals and by 
implementing regional networks, the “pacts for 
employment,” among all relevant labor market 
stakeholders in the participating cities and 
counties. The program was not implemented 
areawide, but designed as an ideas competition 
for Germany’s 442 local job centers that were 
free to participate in the Ministry’s call and to 
do so alone or with other job centers as 
partners. As a result of this novel method of 
launching a federal labor market program, 62 
I 
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“pacts for employment” with 92 involved job 
centers were chosen from more than 180 
applications. 
 The downside of the Ministry’s selective and 
flexible approach was that individual 
participation in the program was not recorded 
in the administrative database of the Federal 
Agency for Work. Individual data on 
participants and the individual treatment they 
received had to be channeled directly from the 
pacts to the evaluators—after the resolution of 
intricate problems of data protection. These 
data allowed a detailed description of the 
participants and their outcomes plus a 
comparative analysis of the effects of different 
treatments they received. However, these data 
did not provide a basis for an assessment of the 
causal effect of the program since data on 
nonparticipants were lacking. What the program 
design did offer, however, was a quasi-
experimental design with participating and 
nonparticipating regions, though the selection 
was not random. Therefore, in our attempt to 
appraise the net effect of the actions undertaken 
on the regional level, we used an experimental 
control group comparison approach on the 
level of the job center districts.2 In addition to 
sheer necessity because of the lack of individual 
data, we saw this approach justified by the 
ambition of the program to produce effects 
beyond identifiable participants. If regional 
networks evolve between the labor market 
stakeholders, e. g., job centers and companies, 
and if the program changes attitudes towards 
the elderly, then this should lead to more entries 
into employment not only by participants of the 
program, but by people aged fifty or older in 
general. This potential regional impact of the 
program was measured by two labor market 
indicators available for all districts, participating 
or not, namely the changes in employment 
levels of the target population and their entry 
rates into employment. 
                                                
2 For a similar approach in other scientific fields see 
Girma and Paton (2006); Millimet and List (2004); and 
Park, Wang, and Wu (2002). 
 The evaluation consisted not only of the 
analysis of the effects on the regional labor 
market presented in depth here, but also the 
analysis of the economic context of regions, the 
strategies of the local actors to integrate the 
older long-term unemployed, the actions that 
were undertaken to activate the participants, 
how and if regional networks evolved, and the 
efficiency of the program with regard to the 
integration costs per person. Data concerning 
the participants’ experiences with the program 
were gathered in telephone interviews as well as 
in group discussions in the field. Also, local 
actors from job centers, educational institutions, 
and companies were interviewed to gather 
insights into the problems and demands 
regarding the integration of the elderly in the 
labor market. 
 
Causal Effects, Observational 
Studies, and the Propensity Score 
 
The fundamental evaluative problem in this 
study is that one cannot observe what would 
have happened to a unit that receives a 
treatment if it wasn’t subject to the treatment 
(also called the counterfactual outcome). 
 A solution to address this problem lies in 
experimental studies where units are randomly 
assigned to an experimental-group that receives 
a special treatment and to a control-group that 
does not (or is treated with placebo). Due to the 
randomized assignment, characteristics that 
might influence the treatment tend to be equally 
distributed in the experimental and the control-
groups. Thus, the (average) causal effect of the 
treatment can be observed directly: it is the 
difference between the outcomes in the 
experimental and the control-group. But for 
various reasons, truly experimental designs are 
rare in social policy. The exclusion of otherwise 
eligible individuals from a program from which 
they would hypothetically benefit, only in order 
to prove the hypothesis that it was this program 
and nothing else that helped others who did 
receive services, is widely perceived as 
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questionable on ethical grounds. In our case, we 
did have a discretionary assignment of treated 
districts but the selection was far from random. 
It was first a self-selection of about 180 out of 
450 potential applicants, and then it was a 
selection of the 62 best concepts out the 180 
applications. The problem that arises from 
nonrandom assignment is that one cannot 
directly compare treated units to untreated ones 
to appraise the (average) treatment effect, 
because characteristics that might influence the 
outcomes despite the treatment are not 
randomly distributed. The distribution of the 
characteristics is then likely to be biased. The 
solution to account for the bias lies in observing 
all characteristics that might influence the 
outcome and to construe an experimental group 
and a control group that are balanced, which 
means they are equal in the distribution of the 
confounding variables. The design is then called 
an observational study (Rosenbaum, 2001). The 
crux with this design is the identification of all 
relevant confounding variables that might 
influence the treatment itself or the selection 
into treatment (and thus have to be observed 
before the treatment begins). Unlike in 
experimental studies where one can assume that 
all confounding variables are balanced between 
the experimental and the control groups, there 
might be a hidden bias between the groups if 
there are unobserved covariates that influence 
the outcome despite the treatment. In other 
words, we have to ensure by reasoning and 
prior knowledge that the outcome of the 
treatment is conditionally independent from all 
confounding variables; this is often referred to 
as the conditional independence assumption (CIA) 
(Gangl & DiPrete, 2004) or as strongly ignorable 
treatment assignment (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). 
 The control group can be drawn from all 
untreated units that could have been chosen for 
the treatment. The experimental group is drawn 
from the treated units and, depending on the 
chosen method to construe the groups, must 
not include all treated units (see below). Further 
all program regions are referred to as treated, the 
nonprogram regions are referred to as untreated, 
and I will refer to the constructed groups for 
the identification of the treatment effect as 
experimental and control groups. 
 The construction of the experimental and 
the control groups is done by statistical 
matching. The goal of the matching is to find an 
untreated region for every treated region that is 
most similar compared to all the other untreated 
regions regarding the confounding variables 
(further on called covariates). As Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) show, it is not necessary to 
compare values of each covariate but to use the 
propensity score for the matching procedure if 
one is interested in the average treatment effect 
on the treated (ATT). The propensity score is 
the probability for the assignment to a 
treatment given the covariates and can easily be 
compared between treated and untreated units. 
The match for a treated region is then the 
untreated region with the minimum difference 
of the propensity score compared to all other 
untreated regions. As the propensity score is 
unknown in observational studies, it has to be 
estimated from the covariates, which can be 
done with a (multivariate) regression model with 
the assignment to treatment being the 
dependent variable. The estimated coefficients 
are then used to calculate the propensity score. 
It is common to use logit regression for the 
estimation of the coefficients used for 
propensity score calculation (Rosenbaum & 
Rubin, 1985). 
 The final matching can be done with 
different methods. In the example below, 
single-neighbor matching and caliper matching 
is used.3 When performing single-neighbor-
matching, the units with the smallest difference 
in the propensity score are matches no matter 
how big the difference is. With caliper 
matching, the procedure is much the same, but 
the matches have to be within a predefined 
maximum distance from each other. 
                                                
3 See Gangl and DiPrete (2004) for an overview of 
different matching methods. 
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 Furthermore, the stable unit-treatment value 
assumption (SUTVA) has to be justified. This 
assumption states that the units, whether they 
are in the experimental or control group, must 
not affect each other regarding the outcome.4 In 
our case, this assumption would be violated if 
people from the target group living in a 
nonexperimental region would find a new job in 
a program region, or vice versa.5 
 
Outcome: Change in Stock of 
Employment and Mean Entry Rate 
 
A common concept for the measurement of the 
employment level at two points in time is the 
age-specific labor turnover rate (Cramer & Koller, 
1988; Erlinghagen & Knuth, 2002; Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
1996). For the calculation of this rate, one needs 
to know the exits from and entries into jobs in a 
given period of time. Information on the 
amount of exits from jobs is currently not 
available for Germany. As a result of this 
limitation, we have chosen two employment 
indicators for the targeted age group in order to 
evaluate the success of the program on the 
regional level. The first indicator is the change in 
stock of employment subject to social insurance 
contribution at two points in time: at the end of 
2005 (before the start of the program) and at 
the end of the first quarter of 2007 (the most 
recent available data before the end of the 
evaluation). The stock of employment in 
German register data is (currently) counted on 
the person level, which means that even if one 
person has two jobs, only one is counted. The 
second indicator is the mean entry rate into 
employment during the observed five quarters. 
                                                
4 Hujer, Blien, Caliendo, & Zeiss (2002) stress that 
regarding evaluation on individual level, SUTVA is always 
violated because of “the immense amounts spent on 
ALMP [active labor market policy] in Germany and the 
large scale of the programs, spill-over effects on 
nonparticipants are very likely” (p. 2). 
5 This aspect can be practically neglected in analysis for 
Germany. See footnote 8 for an explanation. 
The entries into jobs in German register data 
are (currently) counted casewise, no matter if 
more than one entry is from one person. Both 
indicators were calculated from official data of 
the Federal Agency for Work. Before assessing 
the impact of the program, we will compare the 
values of the indicators for program regions to 
all other regions. 
 At the end of the fourth quarter of 2005, 
there was a stock of 24,418,048 employees aged 
fifteen to sixty-five in Germany, excluding 
apprentices. 6,137,334 or 23.7 percent of these 
were aged fifty to sixty-five. By the end of the 
first quarter of 2007, the stock of employees in 
this age group had grown by 6% in Germany as 
a whole. During the observed time frame, the 
growth in stock was lower (5.5%) in the 
program regions than in regions not 
participating in the program (6.3%, see Table 1). 
This could not be expected, as the program 
regions were not selected because of difficult 
labor integration problems to begin with, but 
because their concepts were considered most 
promising in the ideas competition. 
 The changes in stock are not only 
influenced by labor demand, but also by 
retirement and demographics. A growth in 
stock can be effected by an increase in hiring, a 
slow-down of separations, or simply by larger 
cohorts “ageing into” the target group while 
being employed. However, the employment 
register does not provide exit data on the small 
territorial scale of the job centers. We therefore 
calculated the average entry rate as an indicator 
for the dynamics of the regional labor market. 
These are calculated as the geometric mean of 
entries in employment in Quarter Qt divided by 
stock of employment in Quarter Qt-1 over the 
five observed quarters.6 
 As shown in Table 2, the mean entry rate 
for people aged fifty to sixty-five was slightly 
higher in program regions compared with all 
other regions (0.0714 versus 0.0707). It seems 
that in the regions with a “pact for 
                                                
6 The geometric mean was chosen because the arithmetic 
mean overestimates growth rates averaged over time. 
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employment,” the labor market was or became 
more dynamic for the target group. 
 The pivotal question then is, can we assume 
a causal relationship between the existence of a 
“pact for employment” and the measured values 
of the indicators for the success of the 
program? 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Stock in Employment Subject to Social Security Contribution at the End of Fourth Quarter 2005 
and the First Quarter 2007, Without Apprentices 
 
 End of 4th quarter 2005 End of 1st quarter 2007 
Unit Absolute Ratio Absolute Ratio Alteration
15 to 65   
Germany 24,418,048 100% 24,941,332 100% +2.1%
Non-program regions 16,828,464 100% 17,177,804 100% +2.1%
Pacts of employment 7,589,586 100% 7,763,528 100% +2.3%
50 to 65   
Germany 5,787,510 23.% 6,137,334 24.6% +6.0%
Non-program regions 3,990,077 23.7% 4,241,338 24.7% +6.3%
Pacts of employment 1,797,433 23.7% 1,896,996 24.4% +5.5%
 
Table 2 
Mean Entry Rate, First Quarter 2006 to First Quarter 2007, Without Apprentice 
 
Unit Mean entry rate
Aged 15 to 65 
Germany 0.1189
Non-program regions 0.1187
Pacts of employment 0.1196
Aged 50 to 65 
Germany 0.0708
Non-program regions 0.0707
Pacts of employment 0.0714
 
Causal Analysis of the Impact of 
the “Pacts for Employment” 
 
As we showed in the previous section, the 
change in stock of employment and the mean 
entry rate in the program regions developed 
differently from the regions without this special 
treatment, though in different directions. We 
will now check out if a causal relationship 
between the existence of a pact for employment 
and the dependent variables can be assumed. 
Since one cannot observe what would have 
happened to the regions with a treatment in the 
absence of it, we have to assess the effect of the 
pacts for employment by comparing this 
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experimental group to a control group. The 
difference between the mean outcome of the 
experimental group and the mean outcome of 
the control group is then the effect of the 
program on the experimental group, given that 
the conditional independence assumption holds 
(average treatment effect on the treated, ATT). 
The composition of the experimental and 
control groups is achieved with a statistical 
matching procedure that compares the 
propensity scores of treated and untreated 
regions.7 The matching procedure can be done 
applying different techniques. Because of the 
small number of units available in our case, we 
used single-neighbor-matching with repetition. 
In this approach, for every treated unit, a 
suitable untreated unit is identified under the 
condition that an untreated unit can be the 
match for more than one treated unit. The 
outcome of that unit is then weighted with the 
number of occurrences as a match. 
 When performing single-neighbor-
matching, there is no upper limit for the 
maximum distance of the propensity scores of 
two regions. The only criterion for the matches 
is that the difference of the propensity score 
should be at a minimum compared with all 
other possible matches. It might therefore be 
suitable to define an upper limit for the maximal 
distance between treated and untreated regions 
yielding more comparable experimental and 
control groups. In the following, the upper limit 
is called caliper. However, the drawback of using 
a caliper is that there may be no comparable 
untreated unit for a treated within the 
predefined caliper. If the experimental group 
determined under such a restriction is not 
identical to the group of the treated units, then 
the calculated average treatment effect is valid 
only for the experimental group, but not for the 
whole group of the treated. As no formal rules 
exist for the choice of the caliper, only 
reasoning about the object of investigation and 
trial of different calipers can help (Cochran & 
                                                
7 The calculations were carried out with STATA and 
PSMATCH2 (Leuven & Sianesi, 2003). 
Rubin, 1973). With regard to arriving at 
conclusions for as many units under 
consideration as possible, the caliper should be 
generous in order to have only few units 
without matches; whereas with regard to the 
reliability of results, the caliper should be small. 
We will therefore present matching models with 
different calipers and without a caliper. The 
calipers are chosen as a multiple of the standard 
deviation of the propensity scores (Gangl & 
DiPrete, 2004). 
 The matching has to be done with 
covariates measured before the treatment begins. 
Most of the regional data are only available on 
an annual basis, with December 31 as the date 
of reference. The program started in September, 
2005, but as we know from other components 
of our evaluation, there was little integration 
into the labor market during those first months 
of the program in late 2005. Therefore, we used 
data for December 31, 2005 for the estimation 
of the coefficients of the independent variables, 
and the indicators for the success of the 
program are observed from January 1, 2006, to 
March 31, 2007. 
 One problem that could arise when 
observing the regional impacts of a program is 
that of spillover effects, e. g. a person from 
program region A may find a job in 
nonprogram region Z, thus contributing to the 
outcome indicator of Z instead of A. However, 
the willingness of (long-term) unemployed to 
move for a new job is generally very low in 
Germany,8 so that such spillover effects can be 
practically neglected so that the stable unit 
treatment value assumption is not violated. 
 Various covariates might influence the 
chosen outcome indicators and therefore have 
to be accounted for when matching nontreated 
to treated regions. Roughly speaking, these 
represent aspects of labor market supply, 
                                                
8 Only 11 percent of surveyed unemployed in Germany 
would definitely move for a new job, including short-term 
unemployed (Brixy & Christensen, 2002), and there is no 
loss in unemployment compensation or basic income if 
one does not move for a new job. 
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demand, and environment. As an indicator of 
the economic power of a region, we chose the 
regional gross domestic product per citizen in 2005.9 
The past economic development was measured 
as the mean change in the gross domestic product from 
2003 to 2005. Both measures have influence on 
the employment growth (Elhorst, 2003). The 
population density is a proxy variable for distances 
in the regions, which is a factor of supply and 
demand (Arntz & Wilke, 2008; van der Laan, 
1992). From other parts of the evaluation, it is 
known that one of the barriers for integration 
of the target group into the labor market is 
limited mobility of the target group due to 
missing or lost driver's licenses, lack of 
transportation, or the inability to use public 
transport. In order to account for the different 
regional forms of organization and structure of 
decision making, we include a variable called 
distinguishing between rural districts and cities. In rural 
districts, usually more stakeholders are part of 
decision-making processes leading to more 
complex negotiations. The employment policy 
of the companies towards people aged fifty to 
sixty-five is reflected by the regional age-specific 
employment rate. Since age-specific employment 
rates may be influenced by regional variance in 
demographics, the share of the fifty to sixty-five age 
group in the regional population is included in the 
regression model. From analyzing individual 
data of program participants, we know that 
people from the target group find new jobs 
mostly in small and medium-sized businesses 
(SME). It is therefore expected that the regional 
proportion of SME’s positively influences the 
probability of reintegration into work for the 
target group. The regional importance of SMEs 
is indicated by the proportion of jobs in SMEs 
in the region. What is also known from 
analyzing program participants’ data is that 
service companies often employ people of the 
target group. Therefore, the share of service 
companies in the region is included in the regression 
model. The size of the service sector of a region 
                                                
9At the time of the analysis 2006 data was not available. 
is given as the proportion of jobs in service 
companies. 
 We estimate models for Germany as a 
whole as well as separate models for East and 
West Germany because of the remaining 
economic differences between the “old” and the 
“new” part of the country. In the estimation for 
the whole of Germany, we include a variable 
indicating whether a region is located in east or in west 
part of Germany. 
 Although we tried to build the model as 
completely as possible, there are some factors 
that we could not account for due to missing 
data. For example, we could control for the 
number of people living in a region aged fifty to 
sixty-five, but we could not control for the 
quality of the supply that might result in 
structural unemployment because of a 
mismatch of supply and demand in the region. 
A further shortcoming of the model is the 
missing information on money spent per person 
in the target group on active labor market 
policy, but we assume that more money is spent 
in the treated regions than in regions without 
treatment.10 
 Unlike in the descriptive comparisons 
presented in Tables 1 and 2, all job center 
districts that initially applied to take part in the 
program “Perspektive 50plus” but were not 
awarded are excluded from the possible control 
group because information is lacking if they 
implemented their concepts partially or 
completely anyhow. If this should have 
happened, and if such a region were included in 
the control group as a result of the matching 
procedure, this would result in a biased 
estimate. As a result, 145 job center districts are 
available to be included in the control group, as 
                                                
10 On the macro level, it would be possible to come 
across this hidden bias by involving data on the amount 
of money spent by the job centers and the local branches 
of the Federal Agency for Work on active labor market 
policy in the estimations of the propensity score. 
However, data for the 178 local Agencies for Work 
cannot be broken down to the smaller 450 job center 
districts, so we could not include this factor in our 
estimations. 
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compared with 92 job center districts treated 
within one of the 62 regional pacts for 
employment. The pacts and potential candidates 
for the control group are shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Program Regions and Nonprogram Regions 
With and Without Application 
 
 The matching procedure is repeated four 
times. In the first run, no caliper is applied and 
therefore there is a match in the control group 
for every unit in the experimental group. The 
other three runs are done with different calipers, 
defined respectively as 0.5, 0.25, and 0.05 times 
the standard deviation of the propensity score. 
By repeating the matching procedure with 
different calipers, the similarity of the two 
groups with regard to the control variables can 
be optimized against as full as possible inclusion 
of the treated group.  
 To assess the harmonization between 
experimental and matched control group, the 
standardized bias suggested by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1985) is calculated.11 A bias of zero 
percent is optimal, meaning the groups are 
perfectly balanced. Before matching there is 
83.5 percent bias in the mean propensity score 
between the groups of the treated and the 
untreated. After the matching without a caliper, 
there is a reduction in bias of 93.3 percent, 
resulting in a 5.6 percent bias, thus indicating 
considerable harmonization between the 
experimental and the control groups compared 
with unmatched groups of treated and untreated 
regions. Whereas the unmatched groups have a 
significantly different mean propensity score, 
the difference after the matching is no longer 
significant (see Table 3). 
 When the matching is done with a caliper of 
0.5 times the standard deviation of the 
propensity score (0.0952), the bias is reduced by 
97.1 percent, resulting in a 2.4 percent bias 
between the experimental and control groups.12 
In order to achieve this lower bias, four treated 
regions were excluded from the experimental 
group because there is no match for the regions 
within the range defined by the caliper. A 
further reduction of the bias to 0.8 percent is 
achieved by an even smaller caliper of 0.25 
times the standard deviation of the propensity 
scores (0.0476), which increases the treated 
regions without a match to eight. An even 
further reduction of the caliper to 0.05 times the 
standard deviation of the estimated propensity 
                                                
11 The (standardized) percent bias is defined “as the 
difference of sample means in the treated and matched 
control subsamples as a percentage of the square root of 
the average of sample variances in both groups” for each 
covariate X (Caliendo, 2006, p. 78). The percent 
reduction of the bias “is 100(1-bM/bI), where bI and bM 
are the treated versus control differences in covariate 
means initially and after matching, respectively” 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985, p. 36). 
12 The mean of the average change of the gross domestic 
product of the last three years is significantly different 
between experimental and control groups at the 10 
percent level. 
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scores (0.00952) can reduce the bias only a little 
more (0.7 percent), but fourteen treated regions 
are now without a match, resulting in only 
seventy-eight of the ninety-two program regions 
in the experimental group.  
 Breaking the repeated matching down 
between the two parts of the country, it can be 
observed that in West Germany, 62 job center 
districts were taking part in the program while 
123 regions did not apply, and therefore are 
candidates for the control group. Without 
matching, the bias between treated and 
untreated groups is 73.6 percent, with a 
significant difference in the mean propensity 
scores (see Table 4). After constructing 
experimental and control groups without 
applying a caliper, the bias is reduced by 93.7 
percent to 4.6 percent. The mean comparison 
test shows no significant differences between 
experimental and control groups. With a caliper 
of 0.5 times the standard deviation of the 
propensity scores (0.0837), the bias is reduced 
by 99.3 percent to 0.5 percent, and three 
program regions are without a match. A 
reduction by 99.7 percent is yielded with a 
caliper of 0.25 times the standard deviation of 
the propensity scores (0.0419), with four treated 
regions being without a match. A further 
reduction of the caliper to 0.05 times the 
standard deviation (0.00837) of the propensity 
scores results in a negative bias between the two 
groups. 
 In East Germany there are thirty program 
regions and only twenty-two untreated regions 
that did not apply to participate in the program. 
Because the untreated regions are allowed to be 
a match for more than one treated region, this is 
not a problem a priori. Again, there is a 
significant difference in the propensity scores of 
treated and untreated regions before the 
matching (see Table 5). Even though the bias 
reduction between experimental and control 
group is not as high as for the whole of 
Germany and for West Germany (77.6% to 
15.5%), the differences in the propensity scores 
are not significant after the matching without a 
caliper. When a caliper of 0.5 times the standard 
deviation of the propensity scores is introduced 
(0.08614), five treated regions are without a 
match and the bias is reduced to 4.1 percent. 
With a caliper of 0.25 times the standard 
deviation of the propensity scores and six 
regions not included in the experimental group, 
the bias is reduced to 3.0 percent. With a caliper 
of 0.05 times the standard deviation of the 
propensity scores, the bias is reduced to 
0.7 percent but sixteen program regions are 
without a match, which is more than half of the 
program regions in East Germany. 
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Table 3 
Comparison of Means and Bias Reduction of Propensity Scores, Germany 
 
  Mean(PS)   t-Test 
Sample | No match | 
Experimental 
group
Control 
group
Bias in %
Bias reduction 
in % 
t P > |t|
Without 
Matching  0.48299 0.33060 83.5  6.51 0.000
Matched  
Without caliper 0 0.48299 0.47282 5.6 93.3 0.34 0.733
0.5*S.D.(PS) 4 0.46430 0.45987 2.4 97.1 0.15 0.878
0.25*S.D.(PS) 8 0.44712 0.44570 0.8 99.1 0.05 0.960
0.05*S.D.(PS) 14 0.43120 0.43085 0.2 99.8 0.01 0.990
 
Table 4 
Comparison of Means and Bias Reduction of Propensity Scores, West Germany 
 
  Mean(PS)   t-Test 
Sample | No match | 
Experimental 
group
Control 
group
Bias in 
%
Bias reduction 
in % 
t P > |t|
Without 
Matching  0.42046 0.29424 73.6  5.17 0.000
Matched  
Without caliper 0 0.42046 0.41253 4.6 93.7 0.22 0.827
0.5*S.D.(PS) 3 0.39698 0.39610 0.5 99.3 0.03 0.979
0.25*S.D.(PS) 4 0.38981 0.39025 -0.3 99.7 -0.01 0.990
0.05*S.D.(PS) 14 0.34166 0.34240 -0.4 99.4 -0.02 0.981
 
Table 5 
Comparison of Means and Bias Reduction of Propensity Scores, East Germany 
 
  Mean(PS)   t-Test 
Sample | No match | 
Experimental 
group
Control 
group
Bias in 
%
Bias reduction 
in % 
t P > |t|
Without 
matching  0.62416 0.51145 70.2  2.44 0.018
Matched  
Without caliper 0 0.62416 0.59895 15.7 77.6 0.59 0.557
0.5*S.D.(PS) 5 0.55871 0.55218 4.1 94.2 0.20 0.839
0.25*S.D.(PS) 6 0.54529 0.54049 3.0 95.7 0.17 0.863
0.05*S.D.(PS) 16 0.52611 0.52493 0.7 98.9 0.06 0.950
 
Tim Stegmann 
Journal of MultiDisciplinary Evaluation, Volume 6, Number 11 
ISSN 1556-8180 
January 2009 
66
Results: Average Treatment Effect 
on Program Regions 
 
After constructing different pairs of 
experimental and control groups by applying 
different calipers, we calculate the average 
treatment effect on the treated, which is now 
the difference between the groups in the two 
indicators described above: the change in stock 
of employment and the mean entry rate during 
the five observed quarters. For the whole of 
Germany, we calculate the effect for each of the 
four matching models introduced above. For 
the separate West and East models, we only use 
the first three matching models because in both 
cases, the respective fourth model was no 
improvement to the other three.  
 As we already highlighted in the description 
of the indicators, the change in stock of 
employment subject to social security 
contribution of people aged fifty to sixty-five in 
Germany as a whole was slightly higher in the 
regions without a pact for employment. This 
holds also true for the different versions of 
experimental and control groups. However, 
testing the coefficients shows that none of these 
differences is significant. In other words, our 
models suggest that there is no impact of the 
program on the regional level at all (see 
Table 6).13 Likewise, with regard to the 
alternative indicator of outcome, the mean entry 
rates for persons aged fifty to sixty-five show no 
significant differences between the experimental 
and the control groups, no matter which 
version of the model is taken into account. 
 When estimating the average effect of the 
pacts of employment stratified for West and 
East Germany separately, the results are nearly 
                                                
13 As the propensity score for the regions is estimated, the 
estimation of standard errors is done with a 
bootstrapping with 1000 replications (Gangl & DiPrete, 
2004). As some authors doubt in the application of 
bootstrapping to matching procedures (Abadie & 
Imbens, 2006) we repeated all calculations without 
bootstrapping. Even with bigger standard errors the 
results point in the same direction. 
identical to the results for Germany as a whole. 
The coefficients point in the same direction as 
in the description, but they are not significant 
(see Tables 7 and 8). The only exception is the 
effect on changes in the stock of employment in 
the target group in East Germany, which is 
negative when the experimental and control 
groups are constructed without applying a 
caliper, but positive when the different calipers 
are introduced (albeit all three coefficients are 
not statistically significant). 
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Table 6 
Estimates of Average Treatment Effect on Treated Districts, Germany 
 
 Coefficient Std. err.† z P > |z| 
Outcome 1: Change in stock   
Without caliper -0.0252330 0.0052733 -0.48 0.632
0,5*S.D.(PS) -0.0014749 0.0052579 -0.28 0.779
0,25*S.D.(PS) -0.0002063 0.0051447 -0.04 0.968
0,05*S.D.(PS) -0.0016186 0.0055008 -0.29 0.769
Outcome 2: Mean entry rate   
Without Caliper 0.0022213 0.0036029 0.62 0.538
0,5*S.D.(PS) 0.0015045 0.0033918 0.44 0.657
0,25*S.D.(PS) 0.0009337 0.0034367 0.27 0.786
0,05*S.D.(PS) 0.0006279 0.0036060 0.17 0.862
 
† Estimated standard error with bootstrapping (1,000 replications) 
 
Table 7 
Estimates of Average Treatment Effects on Treated Districts, West-Germany 
 
 Coefficient Std. err. † z P > |z|
Outcome 1: Change in stock   
Without caliper -0.0042490 0.0057956 -0.73 0.464
0,5*S.D.(PS) -0.0042872 0.0058559 -0.73 0.464
0,25*S.D.(PS) -0.0046013 0.0062162 -0.74 0.459
Outcome 2: Mean entry rate   
Without caliper 0.0021885 0.0032283 0.68 0.498
0,5*S.D.(PS) 0.0025485 0.0032405 0.79 0.432
0,25*S.D.(PS) 0.0026369 0.0031763 0.83 0.406
 
† Estimated standard error with bootstrapping (1,000 replications) 
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Table 8 
Estimates of Average Treatment Effect on Treated Districts, East Germany 
 
 Coefficient Std. err.
 † z P > |z|
Outcome 1: Change in stock   
Without caliper -0.0031170 0.0114011 -0.27 0.785
0,5*S.D.(PS) 0.0049271 0.0108133 0.46 0.649
0,25*S.D.(PS) 0.0072418 0.0120796 0.60 0.549
Outcome 2: Mean entry rate   
without Caliper 0.0049526 0.0040507 1.22 0.221
0,5*S.D.(PS) 0.0048396 0.0039143 1.24 0.216
0,25*S.D.(PS) 0.0053982 0.0042334 1.28 0.202
 
† Estimated standard error with bootstrapping (1,000 replications) 
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
 
To sum up, no significant average effect of the 
program on regional labor markets for people 
aged fifty to sixty-five could be established with 
regard to the indicators chosen. This is not to 
say that the pacts for employment may not have 
had a positive impact on the individual level. If 
chances to be hired were improved for the 
participants, this was possibly offset at the 
aggregate regional level due to substitution 
within the targeted age group. Furthermore, 
without individual data and a time horizon for 
the evaluation that would allow following these 
individuals in the employment register, it cannot 
be refuted that integrations effected within the 
framework of the program may be more 
sustainable than integrations without the 
program. In any case, however, the net quantity 
of integrations effected in the program regions 
compared with nonprogram regions was not 
large enough to show up as a significant 
difference on the regional level, and the hope 
for effects beyond the individuals treated 
directly was probably vain. 
 The module of our evaluation presented 
here shares the fate of not coming up with a 
significant result with many other evaluations of 
labor market programs (Bundesministerium für 
Arbeit und Soziales, 2006; Kaltenborn, Knerr & 
Schiwarow, 2006). Nevertheless, it could be 
demonstrated that a quantitative causal analysis 
is technically feasible for Germany's counties 
and independent cities even in the absence of 
data on treated and nontreated individuals, as 
long as the program is not implemented 
countrywide. Such an approach might even be 
preferable if the impact of the program under 
consideration cannot be observed at all—or 
only insufficiently—on the individual level. 
However, problems might arise if the diversity 
between participating and nonparticipating 
regions is very high (as would be the case if only 
regions with certain negative labor market 
indicators are eligible) or if either the number of 
participating regions or the number of 
nonparticipating regions is very small. 
 On the methodological side, further 
investigation should be done about how 
different matching strategies (e. g., mahalanobis 
matching and kernel density matching [Gangl & 
DiPrete, 2004]) influence the construction of 
the experimental and control groups on the 
regional level and if the groups remain constant. 
To estimate the effects of the program not on 
the individual level but on the regional level was 
due to the sheer necessity of the constraints 
associated with the lack of individual data. 
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Evaluators always have to deal with constraints 
in data. Our approach shows that when 
individual data are not available, it is always 
worth it to think about possibilities for assessing 
impact on aggregated regional or—in more 
general terms—macro level. 
 The methods and calculations presented 
here give insight only on the effect of the 
program on regional labor markets, what we 
estimated is the effect of causes. Another question 
arises if one wants to know what the reasons for 
the effects were or why there was no significant 
impact of the program. Then one wants to 
know about the causes of effects. It is our 
strong belief that evaluation should always 
examine both—the effects and the causes. An 
observational study as present here is never 
sufficient to get the big picture of an objective. 
In other terms, it doesn’t open the black box; it 
only sees the program as the input and the 
effects as the output. Of course, the client and 
the public want to know if the taxes spent for 
the program had positive effects with regard to 
the programs goals. But an evaluation should 
also open the black box and see what is inside. 
Otherwise, there will be no learning effects for 
future programs and much value of a program’s 
evaluation is lost. 
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